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A THORN IN THE SIDE OF PRIVACY: THE
NEED FOR REASSESSMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO ABORTION
INTRODUCTION
The right to obtain an abortion is a subject which was not
specifically addressed in the original framing of the Constitu-
tion. The Supreme Court has, therefore, searched beyond the
explicit, written text of the Constitution in abortion cases, bas-
ing decisions on penumbral rights1 formed by emanations
from specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights, and the finding
that certain values are "fundamental." 2 However, this flesh-
ing out of the constitutional framework has created problems
for the Court which are not limited to the moral aspects of
abortion alone.
In the controversial decision of Roe v. Wade,3 the finding
of a qualified right to obtain an abortion, based on a funda-
mental right of personal privacy, strongly divided the
Supreme Court. Roe's expansion of the scope of existing con-
stitutional rights fed a growing theoretical dispute concerning
the proper role of the judiciary, as a non-electorally accounta-
ble branch of the government,4 in interpreting the Constitu-
tion. The changing judicial scrutiny standards the Court has
1. A "penumbra" is "a surrounding or adjoining region in which something exists
in a lesser degree; a marginal area." WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 1673 (P. Gove ed. 1961). Use of the term "penumbral" as linked to the in-
ferred fundamental constitutional right of privacy originated in the 1965 case of
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. The strict scrutiny of regulations affecting marriage and procreation under a
fundamental rights analysis was first discussed in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. A primary problem constitutional theorists have with the active position the
Court has taken in the area of abortion is that the Court is rendering decisions affecting
the shape of state and federal legislation. However, the judicial branch is not directly
controlled by, nor accountable to, the people (unlike the legislative and executive
branches which are elected offices). A complete discussion of various theories of the
proper limits of constitutional review is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a gen-
eral overview of contemporary interpretational theories, see Chemerinksy, The Price of
Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Re-
view, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207 (1984).
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used to analyze subsequent abortion cases reflect this increas-
ing schism, both within and outside of the Court.
In the latest of the Supreme Court's decisions on abortion,
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists,5 the Court attempts to clarify earlier theoretical and pro-
cedural pronouncements made concerning state abortion
regulations. Thornburgh reexamines the scope of penumbral
constitutional rights and the use of substantive due process
scrutiny rationales as they relate to abortion issues. The case
also provides important insights concerning how Justices' in-
dividual theories about substantive due process have influ-
enced the Court's decisions regarding abortion.
This Comment examines the historical background of
abortion issues prior to Thornburgh, briefly outlining the de-
velopment of legal precedents concerning abortion legislation,
and noting the changing standards of judicial scrutiny applied
by the Court. Next, an overview of the Thornburgh decision
is presented, focusing on the means by which the Justices sup-
ported answers to the constitutional issues raised in this case.
Thereafter, the impact created by the scrutiny standards used
in Thornburgh on the scope of the abortion right is analyzed.
Finally, a proposal for scrutiny of future abortion issues is ad-
vanced, drawing from the various substantive and procedural
concepts used by the Justices in this case.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Penumbral Right of Privacy
The source of the contemporary constitutional right of pri-
vacy, upon which the right to an abortion has been based, is
derived primarily from a line of cases interpreting the
landmark decision Griswold v. Connecticut.6 In Griswold, the
Court held that a state statute which prohibited even married
couples from using contraceptives was unconstitutional. To
support this holding, the Court articulated a penumbral right
of privacy, implied from "zones" of expressly enumerated
clauses of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments
5. 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. Id. at 485-86.
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to the Constitution." A "strict scrutiny" standard of review
was applied9 because the Court found that this "zone" of pri-
vacy included those rights and liberties "so rooted in the tra-
ditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental," and that these substantive "fundamental"
rights were protected from unreasonable state action through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.10
This use of a more stringent scrutiny differed greatly from
post-New Deal case law concerning state economic regula-
tions in which a "rational basis" test was used. Under a ra-
tional basis test, only the rational relationship between the
means of regulation used by the state and the legitimate, facial
objectives of the state legislation was examined. 1 In Griswold,
instead of applying minimal, rational basis scrutiny, the Court
overturned statutes because the government failed to prove
that its regulation of the constitutionally protected zone of
privacy was not made "by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly."12 The Court suggested that economic regulation of
the manufacture or sale of contraceptives would have
8. Id. at 484. For the original articulation of contemporary right of privacy con-
cepts, see Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); see
also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (rec-
ognizing the "right to be let alone" as the "most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized man").
9. "Strict scrutiny" review recognizes that when a personal right at issue is so es-
sential to individual liberty in our society as to be ranked "fundamental," the Court will
make a more probing review of legislative action, requiring that the means chosen to
accomplish the state purpose be specifically and narrowly drawn, and placing the bur-
den of proving the necessity of a regulation on the government. See City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 426-31 (1983) (describing
the strict scrutiny test as applied to abortion issues).
10. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
11. Since 1937, when President Roosevelt attempted to implement his "Court-
packing" plan to check judicial substantive due process invalidation of federal pro-
grams, Supreme Court deference to economic legislation has markedly increased. The
Court almost totally abandoned scrutiny of economic regulations in post-New Deal
cases, finding a need only that legislation be facially related to any legitimate end of
government. The Court has not overly concerned itself when such laws incidentally
served other purposes, and has placed the high burden of proof that a regulation was
purely arbitrary on the challenging party. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); see gener-
ally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 443-51 (2d ed.
1983).
12. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
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achieved state goals without impinging on the constitutionally
protected marital relationship. 13
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,14 the Court overturned a statute
prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried per-
sons. The language used in this decision broadened the right
of privacy, indicating that the right was not contingent on
marital status, as Griswold might have suggested. 15 The Ei-
senstadt Court further found the statutes it examined had an
impermissible purpose of opposing contraception per se,16 il-
lustrating the Court's willingness to look beyond the face of
the statute when a "fundamental" right is impacted.
B. The Right to Obtain an Abortion
Relying on the penumbral right of privacy developed in
Griswold and Eisenstadt, the 1973 decision of Roe v. Wade 7
marked a major advance in the broadening scope of the per-
sonal privacy right. In Roe, the Court relied on the concept of
"personal liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause" to support a general, "fundamental"
right of "personal privacy" broad enough to encompass the
controversial choice of a woman, with her physician's gui-
dance, to end a pregnancy.'" Strict scrutiny of state regula-
tions was made in Roe, but a novel sliding scale test was used
to establish compelling state interests in maternal health and
the "potentiality of life" of the fetus.' 9 These interests grew in
importance as the pregnancy progressed and were to be bal-
anced by the qualified right to obtain an abortion.
13. Id.
14. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
15. In Eisenstadt, the Court stated: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child." Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). See also Mott & Mott, Prop-
erty and Personal Privacy: Interrelationship, Abandonment and Confusion in the Path of
Judicial Review, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 847, 860 (1985).
16. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 450-52.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. Id. at 153. The Court in Roe neither accepted nor rejected the argument
adopted by the lower court that the ninth amendment provided a basis for constitu-
tional protection of the abortion decision.
19. Id. at 162.
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Under the analysis developed by Justice Blackmun, virtu-
ally no state regulation of the decision to have an abortion
could be made during the first trimester of pregnancy. The
interest in protecting maternal health by regulation of medical
processes used in an abortion was held to be compelling from
approximately the time of the second trimester. The state in-
terest in protecting the fetus was established as compelling at
the time the fetus was determined to be "viable," that is, hav-
ing the "capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb."20 The broad interpretation of constitutional guaran-
tees made by the Court in justifying Roe generated immediate
commentary by constitutional law scholars who questioned
not only the morality of this decision, but also the validity of
the rationale and results reached by the Court.2 1
In the companion case to Roe, Doe v. Bolton,2 the Court
found mandatory hospitalization requirements and hospital
committee review of a physician's approval for a woman to
receive an abortion constitutionally unjustifiable. 23 In addi-
tion to invalidating these procedural provisions, the Court
also overturned substantive language of Georgia statutes
which required a two-physician confirmation of the attending
doctor's recommendation. The decision left only a require-
ment that a physician's "best clinical judgment" be exercised
in determining the necessity of an abortion.24
Doe sustained the constitutionality of statutes relating to
the "manner" of performing abortions based on a finding of
compelling state interest in protecting a "potential of in-
dependent human existence." 25 This "potentiality" language
in Roe and Doe formed the foundation for later dissenting
opinions seeking to limit accessibility of abortions by focusing
20. Id. at 163; see also id. at 164-65 (overview of trimester system).
21. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 171-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substan-
tive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159. For
a discussion of the general history of abortion law, see Special Project, Survey of Abor-
tion Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67, 73-127.
22. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
23. Id. at 193-98.
24. Id. at 199.
25. Id. at 187 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (N.D. Ga. 1970)
(per curiam) (emphasis in original)).
[Vol. 70:534
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on the importance of state interests, rather than on the per-
sonal right to obtain an abortion.
C. The Parameters of the Abortion Right
Having established a qualified right to abortion, the Court
thereafter was compelled to define its scope. In a subsequent
line of decisions, three major areas were explored: statutes
which required the consent of persons other than the woman
seeking an abortion; restrictions on government funding of
abortions; and regulation of the medical procedures used in
abortions. While a majority of Justices confirmed the right to
obtain an abortion in these cases, two important trends devel-
oped. First, in upholding certain regulations, a less rigorous
scrutiny test was applied. Second, dissenting opinions grew
increasingly more elaborate in examining the underlying
concept of Roe that the right to choose abortion is
"fundamental."
1. Consent Regulations
Statutes requiring consent of relatives before a woman
could have an abortion have consistently been overturned by
the Court where absolute veto power over the woman's deci-
sion was created. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,6 the
requirement of approval of a woman's spouse or of the parents
of a minor before a first-trimester abortion could be obtained
was held unconstitutional. These blanket consent provisions
were strictly scrutinized since they affected a woman's deci-
sion-making process itself.
The Court was less cohesive in its justification of consent
requirements when refining its position regarding minors seek-
ing abortions. In Bellotti v. Baird,28 for example, a bare ma-
jority with two concurrences struck down parental veto
provisions. The Court held that if a state required parental
consent to a minor's abortion, an alternative procedure was
also required whereby a minor would be given the opportunity
to convince a judge either that she was "mature and well
26. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
27. Id. at 67-75.
28. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (also known as Bellotti II to distinguish it from an earlier
procedural ruling in the same case, Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti 1)).
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enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision"
or that "the desired abortion would be in her best interests. 29
Upon satisfying a court of this, the court could authorize the
minor to act without parental consultation or consent.
The ruling in Bellotti was based on an altered standard of
review: the consent statute was considered unconstitutional
because it "impose[d] an undue burden upon the exercise by
minors of the right to seek an abortion. ' 30 This adoption of
an apparently less stringent constitutional standard was pur-
portedly based on the holding in the earlier Danforth decision.
It should be noted, however, that Danforth applied a strict
scrutiny review in striking down blanket consent provisions.31
Another facet of consent regulation was delineated in H.L.
v. Matheson,32 which upheld a statute requiring the physician
of an immature, unemancipated minor merely to notify the
minor's parents of her decision to obtain an abortion, rather
than requiring parental consent. The majority opinion in
Matheson used strict scrutiny language in upholding this stat-
ute.33 However, the acceptance of a notice requirement which
might "inhibit some minors from seeking abortions" marked a
shift from intense review of state regulations, as did the find-
ing that "[t]he Constitution does not compel a state to fine-
tune its statutes so as to encourage or facilitate abortions. '34
2. Funding Regulations
In deciding cases involving government funded abortions,
the Court shifted its analytical framework, using minimum
scrutiny, rational basis justifications. In the earliest case rais-
ing the issue, Maher v. Roe,35 state refusals to fund non-
therapeutic, abortions were upheld. The Maher Court justi-
fied its use of the deferential rationality standard by distin-
29. 443 U.S. at 647.
30. Id.
3 1. Under the "unduly burdensome" test, only outright prevention of a woman's
decision to terminate a pregnancy receives strict scrutiny; all regulations which limit
access to abortion once that choice has been made are examined only for a rational
relationship to state interests. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977); Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 147.
32. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
33. Id. at 404-05.
34. Id. at 413.
35. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
[Vol. 70:534
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION
guishing unconstitutional impingement of the right to choose
abortion from the lack of an affirmative obligation on the part
of the state to fund such a choice under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 36 Justice Powell's deter-
mination that a state may "make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion" and may make "childbirth a more
attractive alternative" 37 than abortion were strongly re-
nounced by the minority in Maher, which found the state
funding regulations coercive and stressed the fundamental
right, strict scrutiny analysis.38
This funding exception to the Court's general prohibition
of restrictions on access to abortion was further broadened in
Harris v. McRae.3 9 In Harris, the Court affirmed federal
Medicaid funding limitations established under the Hyde
Amendment of the Social Security Act, which curtailed pay-
ment even for medically necessary abortions, and found that
"although government may not place obstacles in the path of
a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not re-
move those not of its own creation."' 4
The deliberate failure in these funding cases to find sub-
stantive due process violations is consistent with the Court's
post-New Deal reluctance to oppose legislative decisions con-
cerning economic matters.41 This line of cases consistently
avoided imposing affirmative financial obligations on the gov-
ernment but further blurred the appropriate scrutiny and
scope of the right to obtain an abortion.42
3. Medical Procedure Regulations
In examining the regulation of medical procedures used in
performing abortions, strict scrutiny rationale was most con-
sistently applied by the majority and most openly criticized by
dissenters. As a general rule, those regulations which were
36. Id. at 469-71.
37. Id. at 474.
38. Id. at 482-90.
39. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
40. Id. at 316.
41. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
443-61 (2d ed. 1983).
42. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 329-57 (dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall and Stevens).
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found to unduly restrict a woman's ability to obtain an abor-
tion were held unconstitutional. Provisions which merely reg-
ulated aspects of the medical process without curtailing or
making it unreasonably difficult to obtain an abortion were
upheld.
Among early medical procedure statutes examined was a
provision in Danforth prescribing the physician's duty of care
in abortions, which was held unconstitutional for failure to
provide varying degrees of care depending on the trimester of
pregnancy.43 The Court also examined, but upheld, a general
requirement in Danforth that the informed consent of a wo-
man seeking an abortion be obtained in writing, without defin-
ing precisely what information should be given to each patient
prior to consent.44 Confidential recordkeeping requirements
"used only for statistical purposes" were also approved.4 5
In the 1979 decision of Colautti v. Franklin,46 a criminal
statute regarding special physician care of a "viable" fetus was
held impermissibly vague. 7 The majority found that it was
unclear whether the statute, which provided that a physician
use a method offering the "greatest possibility" of fetal sur-
vival,48 required a " 'trade-off' between the woman's health
and . . .fetal survival, ' 49 and therefore found it unconstitu-
tional. In his dissent to Colautti, Justice White emphasized
the state interest which arose under Roe when the fetus was
"potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit
with artificial aid," and criticized the majority for substan-
tially curtailing state power to protect fetal life. °
The most recent framework for analyzing medical practice
requirements was developed in a trilogy of cases decided in
1983, all dealing, in part, with statutes requiring hospitaliza-
tion for second trimester abortions. The decisons in Planned
Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft5' and Simopoulos v. Vir-
43. 428 U.S. at 81-84.
44. Id. at 67 n.8.
45. Id. at 79.
46. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
47. Id. at 390-97.
48. Id. at 397-401.
49. Id. at 400.
50. Id. at 401-07, 409.
51. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
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ginia 52 applied holdings developed in the companion case of
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,"
thereby serving the same supportive and illustrative function
as Doe had for the concepts developed in Roe.54 The six per-
son majority in Akron used the opportunity in reviewing stat-
utory abortion requirements to bolster Roe's finding of a
fundamental privacy right, which included the right to choose
abortion, and to move away from the "unduly burdensome"
standard suggested in earlier consent and funding cases.55
In Akron, a second trimester hospitalizaton requirement
was found to be based properly on a compelling state interest
in maternal health, but was not "reasonable" when taking into
consideration improved medical techniques and women's need
for a "relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe
abortion procedure."56 Also rejected by the majority were
provisions dealing with informed consent and written parental
consent for minors. Unlike the general provisions approved in
Danforth, the Court found that the graphically-detailed infor-
mation in the Ohio statutes, 57 required to be conveyed by the
52. 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
53. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
54. The constitutionally-permissible scope of hospitalization provisions defined in
Akron was further developed in bothAshcroft and Simopoulos. The Missouri statutes in
Ashcroft were overturned because they imposed an absolute requirement of second tri-
mester hospitalization, while the Virginia statutes reviewed in Simopoulos were upheld
because they did not require that abortions be performed exclusively in full-service hos-
pitals. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 481-82; Simopoulos, 462 U.S. at 510-19. This application of
a general rule to specific circumstances is similar to the treatment of the scope of the
trimester system developed in Roe, which was illustrated in Doe. For additional discus-
sion of Akron, Ashcroft and Simopoulos, see Ford, The Evolution of a Constitutional
Right to an Abortion, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 271, 307-22 (1983).
55. Akron, 462 U.S. at 426-31.
56. Id. at 438.
57. The Court found particularly objectionable that the description of the unborn
child's characteristics "must include, but not be limited to, 'appearance, mobility, tactile
sensitivity, including pain, perception or response, brain and heart function, the pres-
ence of internal organs and the presence of external members.'" Akron, 462 U.S. at 444
n.34. The statutes further required the physician to state:
[A]bortion is a major surgical procedure which can result in serious complica-
tions, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual distur-
bances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and
that abortion may leave essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing psy-
chological problems she may have, and can result in severe emotional
disturbances.
Id. at 445 n.35.
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woman's physician regardless of relevancy, and the imposition
of a twenty-four hour waiting period from the time a woman
consented until an abortion could be performed, were
"designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to
persuade her to withhold it altogether. '58
In her dissent in Akron, Justice O'Connor called for a ma-
jor revision of the trimester framework adopted in Roe. She
advocated use of the "unduly burdensome" standard
"throughout the entire pregnancy without reference to the
particular 'stage' of pregnancy involved." 59 While retaining
the determination that the right to obtain an abortion is "fun-
damental," she found the nature of that right had been sub-
stantially limited by subsequent abortion cases.6" These
limitations, she concluded, warranted use of deferential treat-
ment, requiring only that a state regulation bear a rational re-
lationship to a legitimate state interest, unless the state
regulation "heavily burdened" a woman's right, whereupon a
heightened scrutiny test was appropriate. 61 She further criti-
cized the "potential human life" standard as arbitrary, inaccu-
rate and erroneously tied to the viability of the fetus.62 Under
her two-step test, all of the Akron statutes would have been
upheld because she determined that they created no undue
burden on constitutional rights and were rationally related to
compelling state interests in preserving the life and health of
the mother.63
The majority in Akron was able to reaffirm Roe's funda-
mental rights analysis, thereby limiting the scope of deferen-
tial review used in earlier consent and funding cases.
However, the standards established in Akron mark the de-
lineation of two distinct scrutiny schemes: strict scrutiny,
used to overturn statutes which curtail the ability to choose an
abortion, and deferential review, which, even when moving
58. Id. at 444.
59. Id. at 453.
60. Id. at 461 n.8. Justice O'Connor relied predominately on the line of funding
cases beginning with Bellotti, and on Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686
(1977), which overturned a statute barring the sale of contraceptives to minors and used
language that implied the "unduly burdensome" test.
61. Akron, 462 U.S. at 462.
62. Id. at 461.
63. Id. at 466-75.
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beyond rationality to heightened scrutiny because of the pres-
ence of an "undue burden," accord great weight to legislative
enactments. These broad tests used in Akron were to become
the primary support for both majority and dissent in the latest
decision by the Supreme Court on medical procedure regula-
tions, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists 64
II. THE THORNBURGH DECISION
A. Procedural History
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists,65 the constitutionality of provisions of the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 were challenged.
The plaintiffs were physicians, clergy, abortion counselors and
others having related health care concerns. The action was
brought under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, seeking declaratory relief
and preliminary injunctive enforcement of the entire Act. 6
Addressing plaintiffs' motion for injunction, heavily substanti-
ated by affidavits of both parties and a stipulation of uncon-
tested facts, 67 the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania preliminarily enjoined only a single portion of
the statutes which required a twenty-four hour waiting period
between obtaining a woman's informed consent and the actual
performance of an abortion.68 Both parties appealed this
decision.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overturned the
district court decision on injunction, enjoining enforcement of
the entire Act pending appeal.69 Based on decisions rendered
shortly thereafter by the Supreme Court in City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,70 Planned
64. 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986), affig, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'g and remanding,
552 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
65. 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
66. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 552 F.
Supp. 791, 793-94 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
67. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d
283, 289 (3d Cir. 1984).
68. Thornburgh, 552 F. Supp. at 797-98, 811.
69. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 290.
70. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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Parenthood Assoc. v. Ashcroft 71 and Simopoulos v. Virginia,72
the court of appeals addressed the merits of each statutory
provision separately on full rehearing and found a number of
statutory provisions unconstitutional.73 Petition for rehearing
en banc was denied, 4 and the state sought appeal to the
Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. see. 1254(2). 75
B. Majority Opinion
Justice Blackmun, writing for a majority of five Justices in
Thornburgh, found that states are not free to enact legislation
"under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential
life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies. '76
Under this broad proscription, the Supreme Court found all
the Pennsylvania statutory provisions at issue unconstitu-
tional. In order to arrive at this substantive ruling, which af-
firmed the general principles established in Roe v. Wade 77 and
Akron, the Court made several preliminary findings which do
not follow customary appellate procedure.
First, the Court approved the unusual action taken by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which had ruled on the con-
stitutionality of the Pennsylvania statutes rather than simply
reviewing the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motions
for injunction. The Supreme Court reasoned that there was
some limited precedent for such an action 78 and that cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court during the pendency of the ap-
71. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
72. 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
73. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 303-04.
74. Id. at 316.
75. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2175. Section 1254(2) provides: "Cases in the courts
of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods:... (2) By
appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of appeals to be invalid as
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States ... "
76. Id. at 2178.
77. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2176 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Supreme Court addressing merits of wartime seizure of the
nation's steel mills by the Secretary of Commerce on case appealed only as to Court of
Appeals' stay of injunction)). The Court in Thornburgh further noted: "That a court of
appeals ordinarily will limit its review in a case of this kind to abuse of discretion is a
rule of orderly judicial administration, not a limit on judicial power."
[Vol. 70:534
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peal to the Third Circuit definitively resolved many
constitutional issues which were raised.79
The Court then ruled that, although the judgment below
was not "a final judgment in the ordinary meaning of that
term, ' 80 the "full record" before the court of appeals allowed
the Supreme Court to proceed to plenary review of the stat-
utes.81 In doing so, the Court relied on a grant of certiorari
rather than the statutory appellate jurisdiction found in 28
U.S.C. sec. 1254(2),82 the means by which the parties had
originally sought review.
The Court then analyzed the constitutional issues
presented by six statutory provisions not otherwise disposed
of by the lower courts.83 Affirming the fundamental nature of
the right to abortion established in Roe, the majority applied a
strict scrutiny test and found all six provisions unconstitu-
tional. Justification for this holding was discussed in three
sections which examined: 1) requirements concerning in-
formed consent8 4 and the distribution of specific printed infor-
mation to all women seeking an abortion,85 2) detailed
reporting requirements86 concerning statistical information
about each woman obtaining an abortion, which included a
"viability determination"87 of the fetus made by the physician,
and 3) provisions regarding the degree of care a physician
must exercise in post-viability abortions,88 as well as a require-
ment that a second physician be available during the abortion
to care for a viable fetus.89
79. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2177.
80. Id. at 2175.
81. Id. at 2176-77.
82. The Court ruled that "where the judgment is not final, and where the case is
remanded for further development of the facts, we have no appellate jurisdiction under
sec. 1254(2)." Id. at 2175-76.
83. For ease of reference, the statute sections of each provision of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act of 1982 are not used in the text; reference to appropriate sections
is made in notes 81-86 infra. See also Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 304-12 (appendix setting
forth full text of all relevant portions of the Abortion Control Act).
84. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (Purdon 1983).
85. Id. § 3208.
86. Id. § 3214(a) & (h).
87. Id. § 3211(a).
88. Id. § 3210(b).
89. Id. § 3210(c).
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The sections dealing with informed consent and distribu-
tion of printed information were determined to be inappropri-
ate at two levels. Facially, the statutes were criticized because
they required a fixed and extensive body of information to be
conveyed, irrespective of the particular needs of the patient.90
Furthermore, the Court found that this information was
designed not to "'inform the woman's consent but rather to
persuade her to withhold it altogether.' "91 Thus, both the
motive for and means of legislation were held to be impermis-
sibly overbroad. The Court found that the printed materials
were "nothing less than an outright attempt to wedge the
Commonwealth's message discouraging abortion into the pri-
vacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the woman
and her physician." 92
In assessing reporting requirements, which included the
basis of the determination made by the physician of "fetal via-
bility," the Court held that the statutes were facially imper-
missible because they made detailed reported information
available for public inspection.93 The Court found that, unlike
90. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2178-79.
91. Id. at 2179 (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 444 (1983)). See supra note 57 for information required to be conveyed
under Akron's statutes. Section 3208 of Pennsylvania's Abortion Act, "Printed Infor-
mation," contained, in addition to geographically indexed information concerning agen-
cies available to assist a woman through pregnancy, the statement:
There are many public and private agencies willing and able to help you to carry
your child to term, and to assist you and your child after your child is born,
whether you choose to keep your child or to place her or him for adoption. The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania strongly urges you to contact them before mak-
ing a final decision about abortion. The law requires that your physician or his
agent give you the opportunity to call agencies like these before you undergo an
abortion.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3208(a)(1) (Purdon 1983). Also to be included were:
[m]aterials designed to inform the woman of the probable anatomical and physi-
ological characteristics of the unborn child at two-week gestational increments
from fertilization to full term, including any relevant information on the possibil-
ity of the unborn child's survival. The materials shall be objective, nonjudg-
mental and designed to convey only accurate scientific information about the
unborn child at the various gestational ages.
Id. at § 3208(a)(2).
92. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2179.
93. The report required by §§ 3214(a) and (h) was detailed and included, among
other things:
[i]dentification of the performing and referring physicians and of the facility or
agency; information as to the woman's political subdivision and State of resi-
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the statistical reporting upheld in Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth,94 "[i]dentification is the obvious purpose of these ex-
treme reporting requirements," 95 and concluded this provision
might "chill the exercise of constitutional rights by requiring
disclosure of protected, but sometimes unpopular activities. '96
As a whole, the reporting provisions were found to be an un-
acceptable danger, raising the "spectre of public exposure and
harassment of women who choose to exercise their personal,
intensely private, right, with their physician, to end a
pregnancy." 97
Finally, the Court examined two requirements for physi-
cians performing post-viability abortions. The court of ap-
peals had ruled that the statute concerning a physician's
degree of care of a viable fetus was unconstitutional because it
required a "trade-off" between the health of a woman seeking
an abortion and fetal survival, when maternal health was to be
the physician's paramount concern.98  The Supreme Court
agreed that the statute, as construed by the court of appeals,
was susceptible of a construction which required the woman
seeking an abortion to bear an increased medical risk, and
therefore upheld the decision that the statute was facially
invalid.99
dence, age, race, marital status, and number of prior pregnancies; the date of her
last menstrual period and the probable gestational age; the basis for any judg-
ment that any medical emergency existed; the basis for any determination of
non-viability; and the method of payment for the abortion.
Id. at 2181.
94. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
95. Id. at 2182.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2182-83.
99. Id. at 2183. The text of section 3210(b) reads:
Every person who performs or induces an abortion after an unborn child has
been determined to be viable shall exercise that degree of professional skill, care
and diligence which such person would be required to exercise in order to pre-
serve the life and health of any unborn child intended to be born and not aborted
and the abortion technique employed shall be that which would provide the best
opportunity for the unborn child to be aborted alive unless, in the good faith
judgment of the physician, that method or technique would present a signifi-
cantly greater medical risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman than
would another available method or technique and the physician reports the basis
for his judgment. The potential psychological or emotional impact on the
mother of the unborn child's survival shall not be deemed a medical risk to the
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The Court also invalidated Pennsylvania's "second physi-
cian" requirement. This provision was similar to a Missouri
statute examined in Ashcroft, in which a second physician was
required to be present at abortions to care for a fetus which
had been determined to be viable. The "second physician"
provision in Ashcroft was held constitutional because the
Court had found an implied exception to the law when a sec-
ond physician could not be immediately available during a
medical emergency.1°° In Thornburgh, however, the Court
found that the legislature intentionally failed to provide a
medical emergency exception to the second physician require-
ment, thus creating a constitutionally impermissible danger to
a woman's life and health, and potentially chilling the per-
formance of late abortions.10 1
The majority opinion concluded with a strong reiteration
that the decision to have an abortion is included within the
private sphere of "individual dignity and autonomy" and that
"[a] woman's right to make that choice freely is
fundamental."102
C. Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens' concurrence did not specifically address
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statutes. Instead he
examined the scope of an individual's liberty interest, which
he found included a woman's ability to choose an abortion.
Holding that the right to an abortion was indeed a "funda-
mental" aspect of "individual autonomy,"10 3 and that strict
scrutiny review is appropriate where such a finding is made,
Stevens criticized Justice White's use of minimal scrutiny as a
basis of review. Stevens noted the contradiction arising from
White's citation to case law in his dissent in Thornburgh
which affirmed the right to an abortion as "fundamental." 1 4
Stevens, therefore, concluded that White should have used
mother. Any person who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly violates the pro-
visions of this subsection commits a felony of the third degree.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(b) (Purdon 1983).
100. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 485 n.8.
101. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2183-84.
102. Id. at 2185.
103. Id. at 2185-87 (Stevens, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 2186-88.
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strict scrutiny analysis consistent with past development of
scrutiny in abortion cases, rather than a less stringent stan-
dard of review. Justice Stevens also emphasized the impor-
tance of the doctrine of stare decisis in assessing current
abortion controversies. He stressed that the precedent set by
the line of cases following Roe should not be overturned, rec-
ognizing that "certain values are more important than the will
of a transient majority."10 5
D. Burger's Dissent
Agreeing with much of the dissenting opinions of Justices
White and O'Connor, Chief Justice Burger emphasized his
feeling that the Court had departed from the limitations ex-
pressed in Roe.10 6 Echoing concerns raised by the dissent in
the court of appeals,1 0 7 he found particularly offensive the ma-
jority ruling in Thornburgh on informed consent, which, in his
opinion, was a "simple information dispensing require-
ment."'1 8 He also supported the "second physician" require-
ment, stressing the state interest in "protecting the
potentiality of human life."'1 9 Burger called for "reexamina-
tion" of Roe because of subsequent overbroad readings of the
case, and for judicial restraint to kep judges from " 'roaming
at large in the constitutional field.' "110
E. White's Dissent
Justice White began his dissent with an attack on the va-
lidity of the holding in Roe and the development of substan-
tive due process theory in abortion cases. Calling for a major
break with the precedent set in this line of cases, White felt
that all six of the statutory provisions examined in Thorn-
burgh were facially constitutional."'
105. Id. at 2188-90. As a justification for the stare decisis doctrine, Justice Stevens
stated: "There is a strong public interest in stability, and in the orderly conduct of our
affairs, that is served by a consistent course of constitutional adjudication." Id. at 2189.
106. Id. at 2190 (Burger, J., dissenting).
107. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 317-18.
108. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2190 (Burger, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2191.
110. Id. at 2192 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
111. Id. at 2192-93 (White, J., dissenting).
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To support his position, White first provided an overview
of how substantive protection of a liberty interest as a "funda-
mental" right had been developed by the Court.112 He con-
cluded that the right to abortion was not "fundamental"
because abortion did not meet the tests established for due
process interests, namely, it was neither "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty," nor "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition." ' 1 3 He therefore found that the mini-
mum scrutiny or rational basis test was appropriate to use in
reviewing the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's abortion
statutes, and rejected the majority's "unrestrained imposition
of its own, extraconstitutional value preferences" in deciding
abortion issues."14
White specifically criticized as unworkable Roe's trimester
system of viability, with its increasing compelling state inter-
est.1 5 The state's interest in protecting the "potential of
human life," he maintained, is in the entity of the fetus itself
and does not change at the point of viability but is equally
compelling throughout the existence of the fetus. 1 6 He rec-
ommended that Roe be overruled because abortion is a "hotly
contested moral and political issue" which should be resolved
by the people through the legislative process, particularly
since the Constitution did not adequately address this
controversy. 117
In the second portion of his dissent, White attacked the
majority's theoretical justifications used in addressing the six
Pennsylvania statutes. He consistently looked for a rational
basis in these state statutes under minimal scrutiny to assess
112. Id. at 2193-96.
113. Id. at 2194-96. Justice White relied upon due process standards developed in
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), and Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). It should be noted, however, that the Palko test was origi-
nally used to decide procedural, rather than substantive, due process issues.
114. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2196 (White, J., dissenting). The use of the term
"extraconstitutional" has been defined as "constitutional policy making (by the judici-
ary) that goes beyond the value judgments established by the framers of the written
Constitution." M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE
JUDICIARY ix (1982) (emphasis in original).
115. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2196-97 (White, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2197 n.4.
117. Id. at 2197-98.
[Vol. 70:534
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION
their constitutionality, because his arguments were premised
on the belief that a "fundamental" right was not at issue.'
18
In examining the statute concerning "informed consent,"
White found that the information sought to be communicated
would enhance a woman's "freedom of choice by helping to
ensure that her decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy is an informed one."" 9 Justice White distinguished the
holding of Akron by claiming that the information to be com-
municated under the Pennsylvania statutes was facially rele-
vant and did not reach the level established in Akron of a
"'parade of horribles' suggesting that abortion is 'a particu-
larly dangerous procedure.' "120 He found that even though
providing information might result in some women foregoing
abortions, this by no means suggested that providing the in-
formation was unconstitutional, for the ostensible objective of
Roe was "not maximizing the number of abortions, but maxi-
mizing choice." 121 While he felt the majority was "uninter-
ested in undermining the edifice of post-New Deal
constitutional law," he found that strict scrutiny of the in-
formed consent statute "smack[ed] of economic due process
rights for physicians."'122
Justice White also criticized the majority for failing to
hold that district court conclusions of fact concerning report-
ing requirements were erroneous, and for making factual de-
terminations on a record before the Supreme Court consisting
only of affidavits and a stipulation of undisputed facts.
123
Turning to substantive analysis of these requirements, he felt
that Pennsylvania had established a legitimate goal of advanc-
ing medical knowledge by requiring demographic information
to be reported. Though he found the required reports to be
"fairly detailed,"' 24 he thought it was implausible that a par-
ticular patient could be identified based on information re-
quired under the statute. 25 He therefore concluded that the
118. Id. at 2199-200.
119. Id. at 2199.
120. Id. (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45).
121. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2200 (White, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2201.
123. Id. at 2202-03.
124. Id. at 2201.
125. Id. at 2202-03.
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provision was constitutional because it posed little or no
threat to a woman's privacy.
In reviewing the physician's duty of care requirement,
White accused the majority of resorting to "linguistic nitpick-
ing" to come to a "wholly unreasonable interpretation of the
statute."' 126 As he construed the statute, it required "only that
the risk [to the mother in order to save her viable fetus] be a
real and identifiable one" before a method of abortion be
abandoned which would most likely result in fetal survival. 127
He was not convinced that a statute was unconstitutional
merely because it involved risk to the mother. 28 Since Roe
recognized a compelling state interest in viable fetuses, he rea-
soned that "any nonnegligible risk of injury" might constitu-
tionally be borne by a woman to protect the life of her viable
fetus. 29
White felt the majority had unfairly held that the "second
physician" statute contained no provisions for a medical
emergency. He found such a provision in a general clause of
an earlier portion of the statutes providing a defense for fail-
ure to comply on grounds of medical necessity to preserve ma-
ternal life or health. 130
Justice White concluded with an attack on the majority's
decision as "symptomatic of the Court's own insecurity over
its handiwork in Roe and the cases following that decision,"
because in Roe the Court had "essentially created something
out of nothing."' 3' He reasoned that the majority had rejected
legitimate state regulations because it perceived a "threat to or
criticism of the decision in Roe v. Wade," and that the indis-
criminate striking of Pennsylvania's abortion statutes
presented a "warped point of view" on a "tortuous path"
tread by the majority. 132
126. Id. at 2203.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2204 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (consti-
tutional liberty right does not outweigh mandatory vaccination against smallpox,
notwithstanding exposure to illness and death)).
129. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2204 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
130. Id. at 2205.
131. Id. at 2206.
132. Id.
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F. O'Connor's Dissent
Justice O'Connor's dissent condemned abortion decisions
generally as working "a major distortion in the Court's consti-
tutional jurisprudence." 133 As she viewed it, the majority
opinion in Thornburgh made "it painfully clear that no legal
rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoe nullification by this Court
when an occasion for its application arises in a case involving
state regulation of abortion." 134
Specifically, Justice O'Connor was concerned by the
Court's premature decision of "serious constitutional ques-
tions on an inadequate record, in contravention of settled
principles of constitutional adjudication and procedural fair-
ness." 135 Only the question of issuance of a preliminary in-
junction, in her opinion, was ripe for review, and that issue
was controlled by the black letter law recapitulated in Univer-
sity of Texas v. Camenisch.136 Given the district court's find-
ings in the injunction presented in Thornburgh, O'Connor
found no error or possibility of plaintiff's success on the mer-
its to warrant reversal of the district court's decision. She felt
that plenary review by the majority was "unsupported by pre-
cedent or logic.''137  O'Connor also felt the majority had set
precedent by which
[p]arties now face the risk that a final ruling on the merits
will be entered against them by a court of appeals when an
appeal is taken from a grant or denial of a motion seeking a
preliminary injunction, although the district court made
only an initial assessment of the likelihood that the moving
party would succeed on the merits.1 38
Justice O'Connor further suggested that "[i]f this case did not
involve state regulation of abortion, it may be doubted that
133. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2207.
136. 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (noting that "findings of fact and conclusions of law
made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the
merits").
137. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2208-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (successful motion for preliminary injunc-
tion requires a showing that in the absence of its issuance, plaintiff will suffer irrepara-
ble injury and that plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits).
138. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the Court would entertain, let alone adopt, such a departure
from its precedents."' 139
O'Connor then moved from a review of procedural mat-
ters to substantive issues, agreeing with Justice White that the
Pennsylvania statutes were facially constitutional. Invoking
her dissent in Akron, which challenged Roe's trimester frame-
work, she found that review of the statutes using a rational
relationship test, "with heightened scrutiny reserved for in-
stances in which the State has imposed an 'undue burden' on
the abortion decision,"" was appropriate. She stated that the
majority in Thornburgh "appear[ed] to adopt as its new test a
per se rule under which any regulation touching on abortion
must be invalidated if it poses 'an unacceptable danger of de-
terring the exercise of that right.' "141
Justice O'Connor did find some first amendment difficul-
ties with the requirement in the "informed consent" statute
that information be read aloud to a woman who could not
read herself. She felt that such a provision might be construed
as invoking a "State ideology."' 42 Otherwise, she found the
required information rationally related to the state interest of
informed consent and protection of human life, especially be-
cause the materials would be shown to a woman "only if she
[chose] to inspect them."' 143 The "reporting requirement" did
not, as she viewed it, create "a substantial threat of identifica-
tion on the face of the statute."'" Justice O'Connor expressed
no opinion on the potential for the physician's viability deter-
mination requirements to cause a "trade-off" between the
health of the woman and the survival of the fetus, but found
no other reason to preliminarily enjoin that statute. 145 She
concluded that the majority decisions on these statutes were
"bad constitutional law and bad procedural law," creating an
"undesired and uncomfortable straightjacket" which "the
Court has tailored for the 50 States."' 146
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2214.
141. Id. (emphasis in original).
142. Id. at 2215.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2216.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
Perhaps in response to the strong criticisms leveled at the
Court for the lack of constitutional justification in Roe v.
Wade,1 47 the decision in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists148 is replete with analysis about
the proper scope of judicial scrutiny for abortion issues, mak-
ing its holdings as important for the way in which they frame
constitutional issues as for the conclusions reached about
abortion. The sharp differences of opinion in Thornburgh
mark three important trends.
First, the scope of the right to obtain an abortion has again
been altered. Without changing the penumbral "privacy" ter-
minology adopted in Roe, the majority has expanded the
scope of protections afforded to a woman's decision to obtain
an abortion. The concurrence suggests that an "autonomy"
interest may serve as the basis of this broad abortion right.
The dissents are dissatisfied with the results derived from
these interpretations, and call for a major re-examination both
of the right to abortion as "fundamental" and of the substan-
tive due process scrutiny system used for abortion cases.
Second, the Justices are unable to agree on the proper defi-
nition and scope of "fundamental" rights, making a cohesive
selection of a proper scrutiny level and resultant resolution of
substantive issues almost impossible. As a result, the impact
of the Court's "fundamental" right analysis has been dimin-
ished as a basis for resolving substantive due process issues.
The strong principles articulated in Thornburgh, based on
amorphously defined penumbral rights and an inconsistently
applied scrutiny system, make future use of review standards
difficult to discern.
Third, the marked disparities in substantive and proce-
dural precedents which culminate in Thornburgh illustrate the
need for rearticulation of the strict scrutiny, trimester-based
test used by the majority. The seven Justices, holding a fairly
uniform interpretation of the right to obtain an abortion in
Roe, have dwindled to a majority of five in Thornburgh, while
147. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an example of one such criticism, see Epstein, supra,
note 21, at 184 ("Roe v. Wade is symptomatic of the anlytical poverty possible in consti-
tutional litigation.").
148. 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
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support for well-developed, sharply dissenting opinions has
grown. Although the compromise necessary to draw suffi-
cient support of a majority of Justices could not be mustered
for the rational basis or heightened scrutiny tests articulated
in Thornburgh, a number of potential alternative scrutiny
standards are foreshadowed. An examination of these issues
raised by the internal inconsistencies in Thornburgh illustrates
the immediate need for establishing a consistent, reflective
equilibrium in judicial scrutiny of substantive due process
rights as they affect abortion issues.
A. Changing the Scope of the Abortion Right
In developing the scope of the right to abortion, the Court
began broadly in Roe, using strict scrutiny analysis. Subse-
quent case law, particularly funding cases, sharply curtailed
certain aspects of the abortion right. The language of a
number of these later cases suggested that the rational or min-
imal scrutiny standard was appropriate. To justify this
change of judicial scrutiny, these cases distinguished between
the initial choice to obtain an abortion and the regulation of
abortion procedures once that choice had been made.149
In Thornburgh, this earlier flexibility of conflicting scru-
tiny standards has been manipulated by the majority to
broaden rights, and by the dissent to curtail them. The major-
ity has applied fundamental rights/strict scrutiny analysis in
areas previously examined under less intense scrutiny;150 the
dissent uses the least amount of scrutiny possible to under-
mine the broad right to obtain an abortion altogether."'
If commonly held interpretations of the scope of scrutiny
existed, it would be improvident to use cases as controlling
precedent which applied contrary scrutiny analyses (or a con-
trary "fundamental" right assessment) to support later deci-
sions. However, in Thornburgh, past holdings are used to
support issues without regard to the method by which such
decisions were justified. The result of these semantic gymnas-
149. See supra notes 17-63 and accompanying text.
150. Compare Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2183-84 (second physician requirement
held unconstitutional) with Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 482-86 (second physician requirement
constitutional under implicit exception).
151. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2194 (White, J., dissenting).
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tics is the articulation in Thornburgh of four potential levels of
constitutional analysis for substantive due process abortion
issues.
1. Strict Scrutiny/Autonomy Interest
At one extreme is Justice Stevens' broadened liberty inter-
est, which concentrates on a woman's ability to choose an
abortion. Stevens emphasizes "sensitive areas of liberty," 152
and "protection of individual autonomy," 15 3 calling the abor-
tion decision a "species of 'liberty.' 154 He carefully preserves
"a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus
and a human being," 1 55 thereby protecting his analysis of the
proper scope of the right to obtain an abortion from contra-
dictions which otherwise exist when focusing, as Justice White
has, on the compelling state interest in "potentiality of life."
In dealing with difficult abortion issues, Stevens treats the
scope of the due process liberty right as broadly as possible,
seeking balance on a case by case basis.156 The "autonomy"
152. Id. at 2186 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. Id. See also Roe, 104 U.S. at 209-15 (Douglas, J., concurring) (articulating
scope of constitutional protections arising under fourteenth amendment liberty
interest).
154. Id. at 2187.
155. Id. at 2188.
156. Id. at 2189 n.10. Justice Stevens quotes Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be deter-
mined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the
course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation,
built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck be-
tween that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of
content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it
certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided
speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck
by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition
is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could
not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to
be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and
restraint.... Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered
against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally
perceived and historically developed. Though we exercise limited and sharply
restrained judgment, yet there is no "mechanical yardstick," no "mechanical
answer." The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds
which follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria. The new decision
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language used by Justice Stevens suggests a different funda-
mental basis for the abortion decision in conjunction with the
privacy right created in Roe.157 It is possible that Justice Ste-
vens seeks to establish an alternative constitutional basis for
the right to obtain an abortion, to counteract the growing
strength of dissenting theories, should a situation arise
wherein Roe's privacy interest is found inadequate.
2. Strict Scrutiny/Broadened Privacy Interest
As the writer of the majority opinion in Thornburgh, Jus-
tice Blackmun describes the constitutional right under which
the abortion decision is protected as an aspect of "privacy." 158
Only once does he mention the concept of autonomy, and
then only as a subspecies of the broader liberty interest:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution em-
bodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual
liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government.
That promise extends to women as well as to men. Few de-
cisions are more personal and intimate, more properly pri-
vate, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than
a woman's decision - with the guidance of her physician
and within the limits specified in Roe - whether to end her
pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is
fundamental. Any other result, in our view, would protect
inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our
law guarantees equally to all.1 59
To support the holding that the Pennsylvania abortion
statutes were representative of inappropriate and unconstitu-
tional action, Blackmun examined inferences of the legislative
purpose gleaned from a review of the history of the statutes.1 60
On the basis of that implicit pattern, he overruled all the pro-
visions, at times at the expense of stretching precedent. For
must take "its place in relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel
for what is to come."
Poe, 367 U.S. at 542-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
157. Compare Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2185 nn.1-2 with Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at
2195 n.2. (White, J., dissenting).
158. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2178 ("constitutional privacy interests"); see also
id. at 2181 (" The decision to terminate a pregnancy is an intensely private one."); id. at
2182 (referring to "personal, intensely private, right" to obtain an abortion).
159. Id. at 2184-85 (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 2173-74.
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example, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc.,161 a "second physician" requirement was found
constitutional. 162 However, under Blackmun's broadened
strict scrutiny test, similar Pennsylvania statutes were found
unconstitutional. 163 Though not the extreme per se test feared
by O'Connor, Blackmun has framed his analysis using the
penumbral right of privacy announced in Roe, but has appar-
ently increased the scope of protection available under funda-
mental right analysis.
3. Rationality/Compelling State Interest
Chief Justice Burger's general call to re-examine Roe 164 is
magnified by Justice White's specific pronouncements about
constitutional scrutiny and the precedent set by Roe. Justice
White first ascribes broad substantive protections available
under the fourteenth amendment and finds the liberty to
choose an abortion to be among them.16 5 Under past substan-
tive due process case law, where such an interest was found to
exist, strict scrutiny was applied. 66 However, White supris-
ingly concludes that the liberty to obtain an abortion was not
so " 'fundamental' that restrictions upon it should call into
play anything more than the most minimal judicial
scrutiny."167
Justice White recognizes "some value of privacy or indi-
vidual autonomy"1 68 - an apparently broad constitutional
right - but focuses on language in Roe that a woman cannot
be "isolated in her privacy"1 69 to support regulations which
could completely halt the exercise of that right. In selectively
applying this language, White ignores Roe's trimester scheme
and the fact that in Roe the right to obtain an abortion was
found to be "fundamental." White is willing to move beyond
161. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
162. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 482-86
(1983).
163. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2183-84.
164. Id. at 2192 (Burger, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 2194 (White, J., dissenting).
166. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
167. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2194 (White, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2195 n.2.
169. Id. at 2195 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973)).
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"'clause-bound' interpretivism"' 170 to find implicit rights in
the Constitution, but finds no support under the "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" doctrine articulated generally
in due process cases 171 which could apply to abortion itself.
Since Justice White finds the right to choose an abortion
protected only if there is no facially legitimate policy support-
ing state legislation, virtually all of the Pennsylvania statutes
would be upheld under his test. Citing the funding cases, 172
he expands their use of rational basis scrutiny to provisions
such as Pennsylvania's informed consent statutes which,
under earlier precedent would have been strictly
scrutinized. 173
Justice White has taken the flexibility of scrutiny stan-
dards used in previous abortion cases and pulled in exactly the
opposite direction as Justice Blackmun. White seeks greater
justification for constitutional rights than the "something out
of nothing" he claims the majority has used to create a funda-
mental right to obtain an abortion. 174 His test, however,
would give the legislature full reign so long as a woman's ini-
tial choice is not completely denied.
4. "Undue Burden"/Heightened Scrutiny
Justice O'Connor's "unduly burdensome" test attempts to
strike a balance between extremes by narrowing, without com-
pletely nullifying, the protection accorded the right to obtain
an abortion, which she is willing to support as being "funda-
mental."' 175  She states:
Under this Court's fundamental-rights jurisprudence, judi-
cial scrutiny of state regulation of abortion should be limited
to whether the state law bears a rational relationship to legit-
imate purposes such as the advancement of [compelling state
interests, which exist throughout pregnancy, in ensuring ma-
170. Id. at 2197 n.5. See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 12 (1980) (analysis of
"clause-bound interpretivism" concept).
171. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
172. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2198 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Harris v. Mc-
Rae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977)).
173. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 442-45; Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
67-75 (1976) (applying strict scrutiny review of consent provisions).
174. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2206 (White, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2214 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ternal health and in protecting potential human life] with
heightened scrutiny reserved for instances in which the State
has imposed an "undue burden" on the abortion decision. 176
O'Connor's test avoids twisting the already distorted tri-
mester scrutiny framework by calling for a different judicial
analysis of abortion issues. However, as her test is currently
articulated, the emphasis on compelling state interests
throughout pregnancy and deference to legislative enactments
could result in a treatment of regulations concerning substan-
tive individual rights similar to the "hands-off" position
adopted by the Court for state economic regulations. 177
Moreover, this test further confuses just what protection a
"fundamental" right should be afforded.
These positions adopted by the Justices in Thornburgh
pointedly expose the inchoate nature of the scrutiny rationales
devised by the Court. As a result of the Court's inability to
adopt a consistent, unified theory about underlying substan-
tive rights, the boundaries of the abortion right have become
indefinable.
B. Defining "Fundamental" Rights
A serious byproduct of the confusion about judicial scru-
tiny of abortion issues is its effect on the framework of funda-
mental rights analysis itself. Thornburgh has painfully
illustrated the linguistic impasse created by altering the defini-
tion of fundamental rights to support outcomes on various
substantive issues.
The Court has previously found a core of fundamental
rights based on express provisions in the Constitution and has
expanded the scope of these rights via implications of consti-
tutional provisions. However, since it has failed to reach a
consensus on the scope of fundamental rights and a consistent
perspective from which they are to be assessed, subsequent in-
terpretational differences were inevitable, particularly for is-
sues based on the broad penumbral right of personal privacy.
176. Id. (attributing development of this standard to funding and consent cases
using "unduly burdensome" language).
177. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
178. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-85 (1965); but see Roe, 104 U.S. at
173-74 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (notes problems created when fundamental right
analysis is applied to substantive due process issues).
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Ideally, Thornburgh should have been a determination of
whether the right to obtain an abortion under various circum-
stances is constitutionally protected based on a commonly
held test for assessing "fundamental" rights. Instead, the
Court in Thornburgh has lost credibility because it has not
functioned consistently or cohesively in making this crucial,
underlying assessment. Seemingly sound standards of scru-
tiny have fallen short as means of analysis. At the base of this
problem is the lack of consensus as to whether abortion mat-
ters should be examined as subspecies of protected due pro-
cess rights or as individual acts to which fundamental rights
analysis is then applied.
Justice White, for example, details past justifications used
by the Court to establish an appropriate level of judicial scru-
tiny.1 9 Applying the tests used to establish a right as "funda-
mental," White finds that abortion is neither "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" nor "deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition."18 0 He focuses, not as the major-
ity did on the right to obtain an abortion as an aspect of the
right of privacy, but on the very narrow examination of the
act of abortion alone. As a result, he readily concludes that
there is no basis under substantive due process tests to support
a fundamental right to abortion. Justice Blackmun applies the
same fundamental rights analysis, but looks at the right to ob-
tain an abortion as a part of a much broader interest in "pri-
vacy." He, therefore, draws just the opposite conclusion: few
decisions are more fundamental than an individual's control
over her own body, including the ability to end a preg-
nancy. 81 That both apply a seemingly identical fundamental
rights analysis, yet reach diametrically opposed conclusions,
illustrates the growing problem stemming from inconsisten-
cies among the individual Justices' perceptions of how funda-
mental rights should be derived and articulated.
Moreover, in Thornburgh, the majority appears to have
rushed to examine difficult abortion issues - possibly at the
expense of the impact this case was intended to have. The
179. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct.
2169, 2194-96 (White, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2195-96.
181. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2185.
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merits of Thornburgh were addressed only after substantial
manipulation of usual appellate practice. 182 Standing alone,
this would warrant concern. Viewed together with sharply
differing opinions on interpretational issues and the breadth
with which the majority has applied substantive concepts, it
signals an undue urgency to clarify holdings articulated in Roe
rather than to apply well-defined judicial scrutiny to a ripe
controversy.
The interpretivist charge that substantive due process is
merely a device to justify personal or political opinions on
strongly contested moral issues 83 obtains greater credence
when scrutiny rationales appear to be arbitrarily applied to
reach a certain substantive result. The quantum leaps in sub-
stantive and procedural reasoning weaken the precedential
value of Thornburgh. This problem cannot be resolved unless
the Court can agree upon the "fundamental" nature of an in-
dividual's right to obtain an abortion and the appropriate
scrutiny of that action.
C. Proposed Scrutiny Scheme for Abortion Issues
The time has come, not to overturn the holding in Roe, but
to establish a consistent theoretical basis for the substantive
protections of the right to obtain an abortion. The only cur-
rent proposal for rearticulation, however, is Justice
O'Connor's "unduly burdensome" test, and as she presently
interprets abortion issues, it is unlikely that this test would be
adopted unless stronger protection of the right to obtain an
abortion is made. As she applies her test, so much deference is
given to the legislature that the "burdensome" standard
would operate as a de facto rational basis test.
Notwithstanding this problem, Justice O'Connor's criti-
cism of the static trimester-based scrutiny scheme remains
persuasive. 184 Roe's trimester system should be abandoned be-
cause it will continue to grow more inaccurate as medical
technology improves and viability of a fetus can be sustained
182. Id. at 2175-77, 2206-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
184. See Comment, The Trimester Approach. How Long Can the Legal Fiction
Last?, 35 MERCER L. REV. 891 (1984); Comment, Technological Advances and Roe v.
Wad" The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1194 (1982).
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
at an increasingly earlier time. Still, the substantive protec-
tions of a woman's fundamental right to control her own body
by obtaining an abortion should be protected. To do this, the
basis of the right to obtain an abortion should be changed to
more accurately reflect the true nature of the individual rights,
state interests, and potential medical advancements involved.
A more functional standard could be created using the most
logical aspects of the Justices' arguments in Thornburgh.
First, rather than solely applying Roe's ill-defined and ar-
guably limited right of "privacy," the test for abortion issues
should be based primarily on a fundamental liberty interest of
autonomy as suggested in Justice Stevens' Thornburgh con-
currence. This concept of autonomy more accurately defines
the kind of control of a person's physical and emotional being
concerning procreative issues that is truly being protected
under the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights. 185
The scope of the right of reproductive autonomy should be
such that, with the exception of certain limitations tied to fetal
viability described hereafter, the state could neither impinge
on the decision to obtain an abortion nor could it compel a
woman to end a pregnancy if she did not freely choose to do
so. It is this kind of control over bodily processes and per-
sonal decision-making which has been found integral to the
Bill of Rights. 186
185. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), the Court recognized "the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child." (emphasis in original). See also Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2185,
2186, 2195, 2198, 2200 (references to a right of personal or individual autonomy); Gins-
burg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L.
REv. 375 (1985); Schnably, Normative Judgment, Social Change, and Legal Reasoning
in the Context ofAbortion and Privacy, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 715, 772-75
(1985).
186. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids any state to "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. See also Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2186 (Stevens, J., concurring)
("The aspect of liberty at stake in this case is the freedom from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into individual decisions in matters of childbearing."); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 589-600 (1977) (independence in making personal decisions); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (freedom to marry); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966) (overriding constitutional protection of "personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion"); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)) ("zone" of privacy exists which protects "the
sanctity of a [person's] home and the privacies of life"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
[Vol. 70:534
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION
Second, the state interest in a fetus should be found to be
compelling only after the fetus has become "viable." The defi-
nition articulated in Roe, namely, that the fetus has the "capa-
bility of meaningful life outside the mother's womb" 18 7 should
be used as the standard for assessing viability. This distinc-
tion would eliminate problems created by the amorphous lan-
guage abstracted from Roe in subsequent dissenting opinions
which sought to define "viability" under a subjective "potenti-
ality of life" standard,""8 rather than under the more concrete,
objective "capability" test. This "capability" test would up-
hold the substantive principles articulated in Roe and yet
avoid technical inaccuracies as medical advances are made
which could place viability of the fetus at a time earlier than
an arbitrary trimester mark.
The result of these changes would be the formation of a bi-
level test for abortion issues. This analysis would call for
strict scrutiny of abortion statutes from the time of conception
until the time a fetus is able to survive outside the womb. At
the point at which a fetus is viable and until a fetus, by birth,
becomes a separate, legal "person" under the law,1 8 9 a height-
ened scrutiny test, reflecting an increased state interest in that
viable entity, would be applied. In the first level of this test,
encompassing the moment of conception until the time of via-
bility, a woman's right to control her body when a fetus is not
capable of separate existence would be "fundamental" under
the due process protections of the fourteenth amendment's lib-
543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ('"liberty' is not a series of isolated points.... [i]t is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints"); United States v. Gruenewald, 233
F.2d 556, 581-82 (1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1956) (protection of
individual's substantive right to a "private enclave where he may lead a private life");
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right of procreation); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
generally to enjoy those privileges "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness").
187. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 163 (1973).
188. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 401-07 (White, J., dissenting);
Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2196-97 (White, J., dissenting).
189. For a discussion of the legal definition of "person" in the contexts of prenatal
death and abortion, see Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade,
45 Mo. L. Rv. 639, 656-58 (1980). For a review of constitutional difficulties in at-
tempting to call a fetus a "person," see Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-59; Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct.
at 2188 n.8 ("No member of this Court has ever suggested that a fetus is a 'person'
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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erty interests of individual privacy 9 ' and reproductive
autonomy.
The state interest in the health of the woman would con-
tinue to exist throughout pregnancy. Health concerns have
been considered valid state interests long before abortion was
addressed by the Supreme Court. 19' However, in applying
strict scrutiny, a state could neither use this interest in health
to curtail the right to obtain an abortion, which would remain
freely fundamental, nor create regulations which would di-
rectly impinge on the autonomous choice to obtain an
abortion.
Under strict scrutiny balancing, a woman's rights would
outweigh the state's interest where individual privacy and re-
productive autonomy was curtailed. For example, collecting
extremely detailed statistical data which impinged upon a wo-
man's privacy rights of secrecy, solitude or anonymity, would
190. It should be noted that the privacy interest suggested in this proposed test is
not of the same scope as that originally articulated in Roe and used in subsequent abor-
tion decisions. The difficulties resulting from the use of Roe's overbroad right of privacy
can be traced to several sources. First, Warren and Brandeis' article, The Right to Pri-
vacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), which popularized the notion that a privacy interest
could be actionable, created later problems because of the breadth with which it de-
scribed privacy. See Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 233 (1977).
Later, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court skewed the use of
the privacy right by giving it a penumbral basis and by its description of the right to use
contraceptives as a protection of the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms." Id. at 485.
The fortuitous word choice for describing this affront to a person as an intrusion into
the physical space where that protection would most likely be sought, namely, a marital
bedroom, was linked to "privacy." This privacy language necessarily became the focal
point when the subject matter shifted from contraceptive use to that of the right to
abortion. With it came the attendant difficulties of using a term which has been further
broadened by use in a wide variety of disparate contexts. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (defamation); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32
(1977) (statistical compilation of persons using prescription drugs); Keyes v. School
District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 248 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (desegregation of schools).
Any reference to a fundamental, actionable liberty interest in privacy in this pro-
posed test for abortion issues is intended to be limited in scope to the protection of the
rights of "secrecy, solitude and anonymity" suggested by Gavison in her article, Privacy
and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980), as well as her related concept of
protection against "accessibility." Id. at 433-36. By way of contrast, Gavison has de-
fined "autonomy" as "the capacity to make an independent moral judgment, the will-
ingness to exercise it, and the courage to act on the results of this exercise even when the
judgment is not a popular one." Id. at 449. Both privacy and autonomy concepts as
articulated by Gavison are important in assessing the scope of the right of persons to
control what happens to their physical being, including the right to obtain an abortion.
191. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) and cases cited therein.
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be unconstitutional. Requirements such as those contained in
the Pennsylvania statutes in Thornburgh which allowed public
inspection of records, 192 would also be inappropriately coer-
cive because the resultant loss of privacy would detrimentally
impact on the capacity to make autonomous moral judgments.
In the second level of this test, balancing of state regula-
tions would be made, from the time a fetus is determined to be
viable, where a woman's right to abortion is unduly burdened.
The state interest in a viable fetus would justify increased in-
trusion in the processes used to obtain an abortion as long as
the right itself is not curtailed. 193 Under this level of scrutiny,
for example, medical regulations which would require a sec-
ond physician to be present to care for an aborted viable fetus
would be constitutional where they expressly provided a medi-
cal emergency exception. A woman's life and/or health could
be unduly burdened by the confusion arising from a less de-
tailed regulation; therefore, it would fail to meet heightened
scrutiny requirements.
An example of a statutory provision which would be pro-
hibited because of overbreadth is one requiring a fixed litany
of information to be conveyed to a woman prior to receiving
her consent for an abortion. Since the need for information
may differ radically from woman to woman, a simple require-
ment that "informed consent" be obtained would protect the
state's interests while not unduly burdening or biasing a wo-
man's autonomous decision-making process.
It should be noted that under heightened scrutiny analysis,
the method of abortion might be differently regulated when a
fetus is viable. For instance, a saline amniocentesis procedure
sought to be used after the point of viability would have to be
balanced with the state's compelling interest in the fetus. As a
result, if an alternative means of abortion would not unduly
burden a woman's right to actually obtain an abortion and
would result in a greater chance of fetal survival, that method
could be legislatively mandated.
192. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2182-83.
193. If medical technology improved to such a degree that a fetus could be viably
maintained outside the womb from the moment of conception, the logical result would
be that the heightened scrutiny test would completely supplant proposed first level strict
scrutiny review.
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These examples are not intended to be all-inclusive, but
rather to illustrate the benefits which may be obtained from a
modification of the Court's present test. Of crucial impor-
tance in any refinement of due process analysis in this area
will be the ability to adapt to technological advancements
while still protecting the essential right of women to personal
privacy and reproductive autonomy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unlike the blatantly unconstitutional statutes analyzed in
City ofAkron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,194
the provisions examined in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists1 95 provide an example of more
subtle, less facially intrusive statutes. They are nearer to con-
stitutional goals, yet still place an unacceptable burden on in-
dividual rights. Unfortunately, the contradictions inherent in
the mixed use of scrutiny levels and inconsistent perceptions
of constitutional rights divided the Thornburgh Court at a
very basic level. Disagreement as to definition and scope of
fundamental right analysis has greatly diminished the prece-
dential impact of this case for resolving abortion issues and
illustrates the confusion arising from the Court's manipula-
tion of scrutiny levels for substantive due process cases
generally.
What is needed is a consistent, commonly-held scrutiny
scheme which will not jeopardize substantive rights already
protected. Justice O'Connor's proposed "unduly burden-
some" test accords less protection of the right to abortion than
should be conceded, but this attempt to find a solid constitu-
tional theory which does not ignore medical advances is the
direction in which the Court should move. A test which is
premised upon fundamental liberty interests in individual pri-
vacy and reproductive autonomy, which rejects an arbitrary
trimester system, and which adopts a definition of "viability"
restricted to "capability of meaningful life," will allow the
Court to reinforce the fundamental rights of a woman to
obtain an abortion without requiring the Court to make con-
194. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
195. 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
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flicting or overreaching procedural and substantive
pronouncements.
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